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ABSTRACT: Economic sustainability is integral to full-spectrum sustainability and relates 
to governance, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainability. Financial crises can 
potentially cascade out from the economic sphere and amplify issues of political legitimacy 
and accountability, thereby becoming political crises. We compare the 2008 Iceland banking 
crisis and the ongoing Newfoundland and Labrador financial crisis to identify common factors 
that contributed to these separate crises. Methodologically, we take a comparative case study 
approach, relying on a broad range of secondary sources. Drawing on theoretical concepts 
from crisis studies and island studies, we identify several cross-cutting factors, including a 
political culture of anti-reflexivity in the pre-crisis period, as well as communication gaps in 
crisis response. As the crises unfolded, public anger played a provocative role, especially in 
Iceland. Lessons from this comparative analysis can contribute to building full-spectrum 
sustainability for small island states and subnational island jurisdictions.  
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 The “full-spectrum sustainability” framework is useful for conceptualising sustainable 
futures for small island states and subnational island jurisdictions. This framework sees 
sustainability as comprised of four dimensions: ecological, economic, social-cultural, and 
institutional/governance (Foley, Pinkerton, Wiber, & Stephenson, 2020). In this paper, we 
focus primarily on the dimension of economic sustainability as part of full-spectrum 
sustainability. In this framework, economic sustainability refers to practices and forms of 
development that are characterised by economic viability, fair distribution of resource access 
and benefits, economic benefits for local regions and communities, and ensuring livelihoods 
(Stephenson et al., 2019). Others similarly define economic sustainability as balancing 
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economic growth with “intergenerational equity” and “ecological and social concerns” 
(Iaquinto, 2015); as thriving economies that secure local benefits of development while also 
ensuring environmental and cultural sustainability (Edvardsdóttir, 2016); or as development 
that is framed “through the rhetoric of local benefits” (Sandlos & Keeling, 2012, p. 34). Issues 
of economic sustainability have significant implications for the ability of small states and 
territories to pursue programs for implementing more sustainable ecological, social-cultural, 
or institutional/governance systems, policies, and practices. Conversely, as Walby (2015) 
notes, periods of economic crisis potentially “cascade” out to become crises of political 
legitimacy for ruling governments, or full-blown democratic crises of the political system, 
thereby disrupting institutional/governance sustainability.  
 
To explore the relationship between economic sustainability and other dimensions of 
sustainable island futures, we engage in a qualitative comparative case study of economic 
crises in a small island state (Iceland) and a subnational island jurisdiction (Newfoundland 
and Labrador).1 As such, we follow Randall and Boersma’s (2020, p. 117) recent call in this 
journal for increased comparative work on small island states and subnational island 
jurisdictions to better understand the “similarities and differences between island states and 
territories [and] the relative capacities of these jurisdictions to implement sustainable 
practices”. Our comparative analysis provides insight into how economic crisis and economic 
sustainability are navigated in the specific context of small island states and subnational island 
jurisdictions.  
  
For the small island state of Iceland, we look at the 2008 banking crisis and its 
aftermath, which was part of the global financial crisis. This crisis was precipitated by the 
high-risk activities of core Icelandic banks and cascaded into a political crisis involving 
widespread public protest and challenges for the political legitimacy of the government 
(Aliber, 2011; Bernburg, 2019; Duffy, Northey, & Esch, 2017; Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-
Jailly, 2015; Jónsson, 2016; Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson, 2016; Loftsdóttir, 2016; Ólafsson, 
2016). Using any type of measurement, the banking collapse was a large-scale economic 
sustainability crisis, with Iceland being the costliest victim of the global 2008 financial crisis 
in terms of fiscal costs to GDP, at 44.2 percent of GDP (Laeven & Valencia, 2013). 
 
For the subnational island jurisdiction of Newfoundland and Labrador, we look at the 
controversy around the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric mega-development, which is a core part 
of the still-unfolding economic crisis in this subnational jurisdiction (Allen, 2017; Bedford, 
2020; Loo, 2019). Muskrat Falls is a major infrastructure investment which has been plagued 
by substantial cost overruns, delayed timelines, mismanagement, and concerns with 
downstream environmental and health risks. In contrast to Iceland, Newfoundland and 
Labrador could be defined as economically unsustainable prior to the Muskrat Falls project, 
due to boom-and-bust economic cycles (including high dependence on the oil and gas sector, 
which has been subject to a great deal of volatility and uncertainty since 2014). Economic 
                                                          
1 Treating the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) as a subnational island jurisdiction is 
admittedly complicated. The province includes an island portion (Newfoundland), which is the locus of political 
power and decision-making, as well as where most of the population lives. Labrador is on the mainland of 
Canada and is where the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project is located. Newfoundland and Labrador relates to 
the Canadian metropole (and the political centre in Ottawa) very much in ways described in both the island 
studies and small states and territories literatures. However, the mainland Labrador portion of the province has 
historically played a resource hinterland role in relation to Newfoundland island and particularly the capital city 
of St. John’s. As such, we feel it makes imperfect sense to consider NL a subnational island jurisdiction for 
analytical purposes.  
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instability has long been a hallmark of the jurisdiction, including a previous economic crisis 
in the 1930s that resulted in voluntarily giving up self-government (Bedford, 2020). As such, 
the differences in underlying fundamentals between the cases are contextual factors that shape 
their respective ability to respond to economic crisis.  
 
Both periods of crisis looked sudden, but both also had deeper roots. The Icelandic 
banking crisis was preceded by the increasing political influence of neoliberalism, coupled 
with deregulation and privatisation. This supported the increasingly high-risk, high-reward 
orientation of the banking sector (Sigurjonsson, 2011). Overconfidence in policymaking can 
be noted during the pre-crisis (boom) periods in both cases. Iceland was positioned as an ideal 
candidate for an international finance centre, while the Muskrat Falls crisis was preceded by 
a period of political and public optimism bolstered by Newfoundland and Labrador’s oil boom 
of the 2000s and the charismatic leadership of then Premier Danny Williams.  
 
As we show, while decision-makers acted similarly in the lead-up to the crises, 
responses differed once the crises were apparent. It is worth noting that many countries were 
severely impacted by banking crises during the 2008 global financial crisis (Laeven & 
Valencia, 2013). Similarly, governments around the world have been overly ambitious and 
enthusiastic about hydroelectric and other infrastructure mega-projects. However, there are 
facets of small polities that shape responses to crisis and potential for recovery. Small states 
have less leeway for risk than larger states which can at least economically better sustain a 
loss (Reid, 1974), while the same absolute loss of economic infrastructure is seemingly more 
serious for a small state than for a larger one (Bernhardsdóttir & Svedin, 2004). Conversely, 
small polities are often characterised by close-knit social networks, informal communications, 
and easier access to policy makers (Baldacchino, 2018; Lévêque, 2020; Thorhallsson, 2002, 
2018).  
 
Through our comparative analysis, we answer the following research questions: What 
common factors led to these crises of economic sustainability? How did these factors shape 
the post-crisis response and recovery? In answering these research questions, we draw out 
three lessons focused on political anti-reflexivity, communication gaps, and public anger. By 
attending to these lessons, we may help mitigate similar crises of economic sustainability and 
thereby contribute to ensuring more sustainable futures for small island states and subnational 




 Our analysis is informed by key concepts related to full-spectrum sustainability, crisis, 
and island and small state studies. First, we are interested in economic sustainability as one 
component of what Foley et al. (2020) call “full-spectrum sustainability.” Developed through 
fisheries research, full-spectrum sustainability emphasizes the interdependence of four 
dimensions of sustainability: environmental, social-cultural, economic, and institutional or 
governance. While the first three dimensions are commonly invoked in “three pillars” 
approaches to sustainability, we agree with Foley et al. that sustainable institutions and 
processes of governance are a vital fourth dimension that helps ensure the other dimensions. 
As we see in our comparative case study, economic and institutional/governance dimensions 
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 Both the Icelandic banking crisis and the Muskrat Falls controversy represent crises 
that challenged the economic sustainability of Iceland and of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
respectively. Sylvia Walby’s (2015) theorisation of crisis, which is grounded in her analysis 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, is helpful for framing our analysis. Walby notes the 
potential for crises to emerge in one sector of society and to “cascade” out to other sectors. 
  
 For example, the 2008 crisis started in the financial sector and cascaded into the 
broader economy, with substantial negative impacts for masses of workers and homeowners 
who were far removed from direct involvement in the financial sector. In many places, as 
protest movements emerged against bank bailouts and austerity measures, the crisis further 
cascaded into a crisis of political legitimacy for many ruling parties and governments. In fewer 
instances, crises may cascade even further into a democratic crisis that goes beyond current 
ruling governments, but which brings into question the legitimacy of the entire political 
system. Crises also become periods of public and political contestation and conflict over 
appropriate responses. This points to the importance of attending to the different “narratives 
of crisis” that are articulated to the public by various political, social movement, and civil 
society actors. Austerity programs and market-driven plans for economic growth are common 
responses to periods of economic crisis. However, social movement and civil society actors 
can potentially play important roles in articulating counter-narratives to austerity-driven 
recovery strategies that promote more inclusive or equitable responses to crisis. Finally, 
Walby offers a typology of outcomes from crisis that includes the following possibilities: a) 
system breakdown; b) return to equilibrium; c) system renewal, wherein social systems evolve 
into “something different though still recognizably the same”; or d) revolutionary 
transformation into an entirely “new type of system” (Walby, 2015, p. 32-33). 
 
Our analysis also bridges crisis studies with island and small state studies. Islands are 
marked by their intimate relationship with surrounding waters, which leads Brinklow (2013, p. 
40) to characterise islandness in relation to, 
 
 … the demarcated yet liminal space found at the shore and in our interactions with it; 
the deliberate choice we must make to cross to and from an island; the isolation it brings; 
relative ease of access to nature and the possibility of living in tune with the rhythms of 
the ocean and land. 
 
Many cold-water islands, including Iceland and the island of Newfoundland, share 
histories of dependency on natural resource extraction, with traditionally fisheries-oriented 
economies (Stoddart, Mattoni, & McLevey, 2020). The recent turn towards experiential 
alternatives to mass tourism have seen cold-water islands pursue tourism development as an 
economic diversification strategy, based on the combination of unique natural environments, 
recreational amenities, and cultural and historic experiences (Baldacchino, 2006). Both islands 
in our analysis have relatively low population densities with a dominant capital city (Reykjavik 
and St. John’s) and have struggled with out-migration and youth retention from rural regions 
(Antonova & Rieser, 2019; Ommer, 2007). Other qualities attributed to islandness include 
tendencies towards distinct social identities and political cultures (including tendencies towards 
“island nationalism”) that are related to the geographical and economic challenges of 
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Characteristics of being a small state or territory often include limited domestic 
resources, dependency on international markets, limited administrative capacity, as well as 
frequent challenges related to transportation and out-migration (Baldacchino, 2018; Egeberg, 
2003; Ingebritsen, 2002). Small states and territories are often subject to – and must react to – 
actions of larger states and extra-local events beyond their reach or control (Thorhallsson, 
2018). As a result, as Baldacchino (2019, p. 41) notes,  
 
The chronicle of ‘development’ in small states and territories is often much more easily 
constructed after the event, when a series of what are often discrete, disparate and 
serendipitous, sometimes contradictory, events coalesce as a coherent narrative of 
economic progress. 
 
 In this context, good governance (or “institutional sustainability” in the language of 
full-spectrum sustainability) is grounded in the ability to maneuver and respond quickly to 
economic or geopolitical risks and opportunities (Baldacchino, 2019).  
 
Research indicates that the distinctive characteristics of smaller states and territories 
influence decision-making processes, including political cultures that value informal 
relationships, rather than strict adherence to formalised processes (Baldacchino, 2018; 
Thorhallsson, 2002, 2018). Lévêque (2020) argues that a political culture of personalism may 
characterise small polities regardless of whether they are small states or subnational 
jurisdictions. Personalism is marked by several characteristics including strong direct 
connections between politicians and their constituents, as well as a political culture where 
ideological differences between political parties are less important than the strong personalities 
of individual party leaders. Personalistic polities are further characterised by a “ubiquity of 
patronage” relationships within government and across government and the private sector, such 
that the boundaries between public life and the private sphere are often blurred (Lévêque 2020, 
p. 156). In the context of this paper, it is of particular importance to reflect on the influence of 
these characteristics on the crisis decision-making process. In these cases where core values of 
citizens are threatened, we further ask how societal cultures are influential in the situation 
leading to the crises as well as in crisis responses. 
 
Both the Icelandic banking crisis and the Newfoundland and Labrador financial crisis 
have been examined elsewhere. Iceland has drawn much scholarly attention for being the first 
and biggest casualty of the global financial crisis but also for its speedy recovery.  Duffy et 
al. (2017) analyse the key factors leading to the Icelandic banking crisis and note that 
deregulation led to an atmosphere of insufficient monitoring and regulation that encouraged 
“rampant speculation, enabled by a web of cronyism” (p. 331). In the lead-up to the crisis 
“banks were operating under the assumption that there was no prudential monitoring, there 
was no default risk and, in any case, banks would be insulated from default by the 
government” (p. 339).  
 
For Bernburg (2019), Iceland provides an ideal example of Walby’s notion of 
cascading crises, as the crisis originated in the finance sector and moved out to the broader 
economy and then became a crisis of public trust in established political parties. Iceland was 
unique among developed countries embroiled in the 2008 global financial crisis in allowing 
banks to fail, imposing sanctions on those responsible, and implementing substantial reforms 
to the banking system (Duffy et al., 2017; Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2015). In their 
analysis of the crisis, Hallgrímsdóttir and Brunet-Jailly (2015) attribute these outcomes to the 
political efficacy of the widespread “pots and pans” protest movement, which involved 
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mobilisation of people from across the political spectrum. Anti-government protest in Iceland 
was unusual prior the 2008 crisis, but the crisis provoked protest that drew widespread 
participation and relied on frames centred around “economic inequality, political corruption 
favouring the wealthy, and authority” as main concerns (Bernburg, 2019, p. 1019). The after-
effects of the pots and pans protest are still being felt through closer public attention to 
potential corruption and misconduct by political and economic elites, as demonstrated by the 
anti-government protests following the 2016 Panama Papers controversy (Bernburg, 2019).  
 
The Newfoundland and Labrador financial crisis – and Muskrat Falls as a core 
component – has received less scholarly attention than the Icelandic case. Bedford analyses 
the Newfoundland and Labrador financial crisis and notes several structural factors that are 
leading the province towards the “road to insolvency” (Bedford, 2020, p. 539), including 
demographic challenges of low population density, an aging and declining population, and 
high unemployment rates. Reflecting these challenges, Bedford notes that during the period 
1980-2016, which includes the offshore oil boom years, “the province posted only six 
surpluses” (p. 539). However, Bedford also notes the pursuit of “ill-fated” and costly hydro 
mega-project development, including Muskrat Falls, as a core “piece of the fiscal puzzle” (p. 
540). Bedford (2020, p. 541) sums up the contribution of Muskrat Falls to the financial crisis 
as follows, 
 
If the debt from Muskrat Falls is added to provincial debt, the debt to GDP ratio rises 
to 79%, or $52,000 for each Newfoundlander and Labradorian. Starting in 2022, the 
$750 million in annual interest on those loans will be charged indirectly to the taxpayer 
through higher electricity rates, which is projected to nearly double prices to 22.9 
cents/kWh.1. 
 
 As such, the Muskrat Falls controversy is integral to understanding the current 
financial crisis.  
  
 Tina Loo (2019, p. 272) emphasizes how the Muskrat Falls project was framed by 
government as much-needed retribution for the perceived injustices of the earlier Churchill 
Falls hydroelectric mega-project, which benefitted Quebec more than Newfoundland and 
Labrador. The dominant pre-crisis narrative used Muskrat Falls to connect “development 
[with] self-determination” as a province. However, as Muskrat Falls was sanctioned and 
proceeded, concerns were raised about downstream environmental health risks, as well as 





 Iceland is a small island state and Newfoundland and Labrador is a subnational island 
jurisdiction of Canada. There are several reasons for comparing these small states and 
territories to find common characteristics that led to periods of economic crisis, as well as 
points of divergence in how decision-makers and the public responded. First, both share North 
Atlantic and northern geographies, relatively small populations, and low population densities 
beyond their respective capital cities of Reykjavik and St. John’s. Both are traditionally 
fisheries-based societies, which have looked to energy development and tourism as forms of 
economic diversification (Antonova & Rieser, 2019; Stoddart et al., 2020; Ommer, 2007). 
There are also important differences. While both cases have democratic political systems, 
Iceland is characterised by a more consensus-oriented and corporatist political culture that 
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encourages higher levels of consultation with non-state actors. By contrast, Newfoundland 
and Labrador – a subnational jurisdiction of Canada – sits towards the majoritarian and 
pluralist end of the political spectrum, where policymaking is more strongly dominated by the 
ruling political party (Lijphart, 2012). The combination of similarities and differences 
provides fertile ground for comparative analysis and extends previous efforts to develop 
comparisons across North Atlantic research sites (Stoddart et al., 2020; Brinklow & Gibson, 
2017; Vodden et al., 2015). 
 
This project uses a comparative case study approach to the Icelandic banking crisis 
and the Muskrat Falls controversy. We draw on multiple sources of existing and publicly 
accessible data. We assembled an archive of secondary sources and written documents for 
analysis, including the report of the Investigation Commission of Althing (The Icelandic 
Parliament), submissions to the Muskrat Falls Inquiry and the Joint Panel Environmental 
Assessment on the Lower Churchill, as well as news articles and academic and grey literature. 
Analysis of textual data was complemented by expert interviews. For the Newfoundland and 
Labrador case, we also viewed public events including public hearings of the Muskrat Falls 
inquiry held in St. John’s and Happy Valley-Goose Bay (Labrador) during the summer of 
2019, which were available online. 
  
Table 1: Qualitative Comparison Table for Cross-Case Comparison. 
 
Dimension Iceland NL Key points of 
comparison 
Place the crisis in its proper historical, institutional, and 
political context 
   
Preparedness, Prevention, and Mitigation (Risk 
Reduction) 
   
Leadership: Decision Making Units    
Crisis Communication (Information Management)    
Learning    
Which actors and organisations were included and 
excluded from the political and media sphere debates 
during and following these periods of financial crisis? 
   
Which narratives and justifications were mobilised 
during and following these periods of financial crisis?  
   
What legal and policy mechanisms were employed, 
eliminated, or generated to allow these crises to 
happen? 
   
What lessons and approaches can be taken in the future 
to prevent similar crises? 
   
 
 Each case study team carried out inductive, qualitative data analysis based on shared 
analytical themes that have proved important in crisis management research (Hermann, 
Dayton, & Svedin, 2006; Renn, 2008; Stern & Sundelius, 2002) including: Preparedness, 
Prevention, and Mitigation (Risk Reduction); Leadership and Decision-Making Units; Crisis 
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Communication (Information Management); and Learning. The analysis evolved through 
discussion among research collaborators with expertise in economics, community 
engagement, and regional studies. Preliminary results were shared with community partners 
who were given the opportunity to comment. This iterative approach to the case study analysis 
helped ensure face validity for our results.  
  
 The synthesis and comparison of the two cases was done with qualitative comparison 
tables (Stoddart et al., 2020). Table 1 shows the template for the framework used for 
synthesizing results from the two cases, with analytical dimensions in the rows and case 
studies and their points of comparison making up the columns. The draft comparative analysis 
was shared, discussed, and revised across the two case study research teams.  
 
Results: Three lessons 
 
Political culture of anti-reflexivity 
  
 The first lesson from our case study comparison is that a political culture of anti-
reflexivity enabled high-risk decision making leading up to these crises. Failure to detect or 
heed early warnings is a common cause of risk governance problems (Renn, 2008). This is 
demonstrated in both our cases. Analysing any pre-crisis period entails potential hindsight 
bias, in terms of assessing decision-makers’ actions relative to the information and expert 
opinions available at the time, as well as assessing decision-making amid the uncertainties of 
the global financial system or energy markets. In addition, the limited capacity of 
governments in small polities may also make complex decision-making more difficult in 
situations of high uncertainty. With these qualifications in mind, in both cases we see that 
early warnings were raised by experts about the deregulation of the Icelandic banking system, 
as well as the necessity for the Muskrat Falls development. Decision-makers purposefully 
reduced review opportunities and operated in echo chambers and often did not seek the data 
they needed to make prudent decisions.  
 
In Iceland, early warning signals began to appear in 2006. International media reported 
worries about the stability of the banks. The Fitch and Merill Lynch reports published in the 
first quarter of that year harshly criticised the Icelandic banks, which led to the 2006 “mini 
crisis” that was described as a 10-day bank run (Jónsson, 2006). The Danske bank produced 
their “Geysir Crisis” report, which warned that the Iceland economy was on the point of 
exploding. Finally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave warning signals in its 2006 
report on Iceland. However, the Icelandic banking system did not respond by following 
suggestions to limit its size. The banks collapsed two years later for many of the reasons they 
were criticised for in 2006. Responses to the 2006 mini crisis also demonstrated the anti-
reflexivity that helped pave the way to the 2008 crisis. Icelandic bankers and politicians took 
to the defensive and interpreted the mini crisis as the result of a lack of information about the 
banks, or as a mere problem of reputation (Wade & Sigurgeirsdottir, 2010). As part of its PR 
campaign, the Iceland Chamber of Commerce commissioned a report on the financial system 
from American and Icelandic economists affirming the stability of the banks, which stood in 
marked contrast to the IMF report written at the same time (see Mishkin & Herbertsson, 2006). 
The Minister of Industry and Trade responded by saying that discussions about the economy 
running aground were rooted in envy from neighboring nations for Icelandic prosperity and 
power (‘Endalok íslenskrar útrásar,’ 2006). Danish critics were particularly viewed as envious 
critics in the eyes of many Icelanders, which also worked to temper critical voices among 
Icelanders who also had to withstand attacks from abroad (Loftsdóttir, 2016).   




Before the crisis, there were mixed opinions among experts between those advocating 
for more restrictions because the banking system was characterised by high risk and 
vulnerability, contrasted with those (including from the Central Bank and Financial 
Supervisory Authority) that claimed the system was well-prepared and stable (Aliber, 2011). 
Reflecting the difficulties of making decisions under conditions of high uncertainty, financial 
authorities were unable to respond rapidly by assessing the banks or providing sufficient 
information to government (Baudino, Sturluson, & Svoronos, 2020). Furthermore, domestic 
media did not play a pivotal role in framing the crisis, but generally joined the game of 
encouraging the high-risk behaviour of the financial sector that provoked the crisis. Dominant 
media narratives before the crisis echoed the euphoria of the boom years and valorised the 
wealth and success of bankers and the business sector (Ingimundarson et al., 2016; Loftsdóttir, 
2016). It was largely left to protest movements to articulate a more critical counter-narrative 
as the crisis unfolded (Bernburg, 2019; Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2015). 
 
There was a political culture wherein decision makers downplayed these risks. The 
banks re-oriented towards aggressive leveraged mergers and acquisitions. Incentive schemes 
led to grossly misreporting bank equity levels, leading to expansion of poor-quality loan 
portfolios. The banks also facilitated the use of offshore tax havens among Icelandic 
financiers. A culture of high-risk behaviour came to characterise the Icelandic financial and 
business environment in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis (also Duffy et al., 2017). While 
egalitarianism and strong social relations are core cultural values, these were tested by the 
emergence of a super-rich class that emerged in the build-up to the crisis (Bernhardsdóttir, 
2015). Before the crisis, the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) and Central Bank were 
largely passive and did not impose restrictions on banks, despite forewarnings of the high 
risks within the banking sector. Those who were critical of the “new order” were often 
marginalised for expressing envy and a lack of foresight. As such, the high-risk activities of 
the banking sector took on symbolic importance beyond their economic impacts (Johnsen, 
2014; Loftsdóttir, 2016).  
 
Turning to Newfoundland and Labrador, we similarly see that there were contrasting 
opinions between expert economists about the feasibility and value of the Muskrat Falls 
project (Feehan, 2012; Locke, 2012). Review of the Muskrat Falls project was provided by 
the Public Utilities Board (PUB) and through Environmental Assessment (under the Federal 
government). These independent and arm’s length reviews flagged problems early on but 
were generally ignored by decision-makers. Initially, the Lower Churchill development was 
excluded from PUB review, but following public pressure, received simplified review with a 
narrow scope. The PUB review flagged problems with the transparency and quality of 
information from Nalcor. Similarly, the Joint Environmental Assessment Panel review also 
received insufficient information from Nalcor and worked within a constrained scope 
regarding terms of reference, including lack of consideration for alternatives to Muskrat Falls 
or for Indigenous land use. This panel report recommended against the project but was ignored 
by the province. 
 
Personalistic political cultures oriented around the strong personalities of party leaders 
are characteristic of small polities (Lévêque, 2020). Consistent with this perspective, the 
offshore oil boom of the early 2000s and charismatic leadership of Premier Danny Williams 
led to an atmosphere of undue optimism that facilitated the Muskrat Falls project despite early 
red flags. As House (2021) notes, Williams was in many ways the “luckiest” Premier in post-
confederation history, as he was in office during the time of booming oil royalties and an 
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unprecedented “seven years of abundance,” which cemented his popularity with the public. 
However, the authoritarian styles of powerful leaders tend to over-rule others’ decisions, are 
closed to new information, and have low tolerance for dissent (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & 
Shaw, 2001). These characteristics have also been attributed to Premier Williams (House, 
2021; Marland & Kerby, 2014). Muskrat Falls was also symbolically important as retribution 
for the perceived injustices of the earlier Churchill Falls hydro mega-project on the upper 
Churchill River, which had seen most of the economic benefits flow to the neighbouring 
province of Quebec since the 1970s (Loo, 2019). The 2007 report “Focusing Our Energy” 
asserted the need to be prudent in developing the Lower Churchill in a way to ensure maximum 
provincial benefit. Additionally, most of the public did not question governmental decision-
making. As David Cochrane (2017, p. 60) critically points out, a culture of “patriotic 
correctness” limits public discourse, “Where the simple questioning or criticism of the 
government or the premier is viewed as an unpatriotic assault upon the very fabric of 
Newfoundland and Labrador”. Bannister elaborates on this concept, stating “Accompanying 
this patriotic correctness was an optimistic correctness that viewed public skepticism towards 
government policy as unhealthy negativity towards the province’s future” (Bannister, 2012, p. 
218). This political culture constrained opportunities for dialogue during the Williams era 
(House, 2021). 
The subsequent Conservative government, under Kathy Dunderdale, officially 
authorised the project. Decisions to sanction the project, secure loan guarantees, accept 
mounting cost estimates, ignore recommendations of the Public Utility Board and 
Environmental Assessment panel were under her authority. The provincial government took a 
blank cheque approach to Muskrat Falls in its 2011 Letter of Commitment, providing an 
unlimited amount of money for the project. Coupled with the Federal loan guarantee this 
allowed Nalcor to obtain favourable credit ratings for the project. The provincial Liberal 
Government assumed power and inherited the project under ever-increasing costs (Author, 
2021). They proceeded based on a path dependency argument that the project was too far along 
to reverse course.  
A political culture of undue optimism, where the high-risk pursuit of deregulating 
banks and mega-project development took on symbolic value, worked against political 
reflexivity about the long-term viability and risks of these projects when early red flags were 
raised by agencies like the IMF, or in processes including Environmental Assessment and 




As both crises became apparent and were acknowledged by decision-makers, there 
were issues of transparency and communication, both internally in the “back stage” among 
government agencies and decision-makers, as well as in the “front stage” between the 
government and decision-makers and the public and media (Wong, 2018).   
 
In the Icelandic case, on September 29, 2008, there was a public announcement of 
nationalising the bank Glitnir as a way of communicating the emerging crisis to the public. 
This was the first step in admitting the crisis and the first concrete government response. The 
announcement was jointly made by both Glitnir and the government. The key message was 
that nationalisation would ensure the stability of the bank. Despite the announcement, the 
Icelandic krona (ISK currency) declined further, reflecting the growing distrust of markets for 
the Icelandic financial system. The public acknowledgement of the crisis shifted the 
communication context that decision-makers operated within. This marks the point where the 
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crisis “cascaded” (Walby, 2015) from a “private” financial crisis to a public economic crisis 
through nationalisation and public ownership in the banks. Soon after, on October 6, 2008, 
Prime Minister Geir Haarde gave a national television address about the crisis and need for 
regulatory measures by government. He “narrated” the crisis (Walby, 2015) as part of a 
broader international storm, referring to the unfolding global financial crisis. There was public 
admission that the banks were in trouble but also calls for the public to show solidarity and 
optimism (Bernburg, 2016). 
 
During the peak crisis period, it became clear that communication and collaboration 
within the government was not working well, which created increasing pressure and 
contributed to poor decision-making. Communication was a major problem among decision-
makers, and between decision-makers and external audiences, including Icelandic media and 
the public, as well as international governments and experts. Inadequate information 
management, including a lack of media strategy, was a key shortcoming in managing the 
crisis. The sense that information and truth were withheld from the public amplified the public 
resentment, protests, and crisis of legitimacy for government.  
 
Turning to the Muskrat Falls case, according to political scientist Kelly Blidook 
(2019), there was a workplace culture within the Newfoundland and Labrador civil service of 
focusing on the risks and negative implications of information transparency. The result was 
that civil servants often avoided written documentation and avoided voicing critical positions 
out of a perception that this was high-risk behaviour. This organisational culture led to 
communication failures, lack of transparency, and lack of accountability. Throughout the 
Public Utilities Board and Environmental Assessment reviews, concerns were also raised 
about Nalcor’s unwillingness to share information, as well as the quality of information. The 
Federal Independent Engineer endorsed much of Nalcor’s work but noted the unrealistic 
schedule and risks from the lack of contingency planning, but this report was heavily edited 
by Nalcor and it was not provided to the provincial government. 
 
Particularly early on, before the project reached crisis, public participation and critique 
were constrained by dominant narratives of economic development and support for 
government. Furthermore, media access to Premier Williams was often limited for those who 
were critical of the Premier and government, leading to a tempering of media oversight and 
critique. Messaging and information flow were tightly controlled by government to minimise 
public concern and dissent. 
 
Across our cases, there are two related issues with crisis communication. First, within-
government communication failures and lack of transparency were factors in the crisis. For 
example, the Minister of Commerce was often excluded from communication in the Icelandic 
case. A key difference is that in the Newfoundland and Labrador case, there were also ongoing 
issues of information transparency and accountability in the chain of communication between 
Nalcor and the government. In terms of internal communication gaps between governmental 
decision-makers and agencies like the Icelandic central bank or Nalcor, these gaps were in the 
flow of important information across agencies and among decision-makers, rather than issues 
of mutual misunderstanding of the roles or mandates of the different agencies. These “back 
stage” (Wong, 2018) communication gaps demonstrate how risk governance problems are 
often created from lack of clarity about who is responsible or accountable (Renn, 2008). 
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Second, “front stage” (Wong, 2018) communication between decision-makers and 
media and the public was also an issue. In both cases, in the lead-up to the crisis there was 
little space for media and public dissent from dominant narratives of economic boosterism 
and optimism. As both crises unfolded, there was a perception of a lack of information 
transparency from decision-makers to the public. These communication failures demonstrate 
the importance of clear and early communication with stakeholders and the public (see Renn, 
2008). 
 
Public anger and political legitimacy  
  
 As these crises unfolded, political reflexivity about governance failures generally did 
not originate from government actors or agencies responsible for oversight of the banking 
sector or the Muskrat Falls project. Instead, political reflexivity emerged primarily as a 
reaction through public protest after these crises were apparent. In part, this reflects that there 
were few opportunities for meaningful public participation before both crises became 
apparent. Once mobilised, protest movements presented a channel for financial or economic 
crises to potentially “cascade” (Walby, 2015) into crises of political legitimacy. Our 
discussions of political cultures of anti-reflexivity and communications gaps highlight the 
similarities across cases in the emergence of crisis. However, when we turn to issues of public 
anger and political legitimacy, we see clear differences in how the crises were addressed and 
the pathways towards post-crisis recovery. 
 
In the Icelandic case, protest was widespread and vocal (see also Bernburg, 2019; 
Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2015). Public protests emerged in October, with a first rally 
drawing approximately 1,000 people. The initial protests followed closely from PM Haarde’s 
television address. The subsequent January 20 protest outside parliament involved 2,000 
people, with demands for the resignation of the Prime Minister. Protesters also objected to the 
use of “terrorist” legislation by the UK against Iceland to enable the freezing of bank assets. 
Collective action included frequent large protest rallies at the national legislature, where the 
loud banging of kitchenware earned the movement the name the “pots and pans revolution.” 
This pots and pans revolution escalated through January 2009. The protests focused primarily 
on government and political leadership (Bernburg, 2016; Ólafsson, 2016). 
 
Most often, the first framing of crisis holds (Boin, Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2017); 
but such was not the case in Iceland. While PM Haarde described it as a serious global crisis 
that was caused somewhere else and was therefore somewhat unavoidable, the public’s initial 
focus on the local causes of the crisis disrupted the government narrative. The crisis was re-
narrated by the public and protesters as an expression of an underlying systemic crisis of 
legitimacy in the political system, with claims of corruption and elitist behaviour (Bernburg, 
2016, Ólafsson, 2016). Protest framing emphasized that those who did not benefit from the 
financial bubble should not be punished for the mistakes of financial and governmental elites. 
This public counter-narrative framed the crisis as a crisis of political legitimacy made worse 
by decision-makers’ actions. In conflicts, issues may be connected to social themes to 
heighten participation (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). This was the case in Iceland where 
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In the Icelandic case, public anger was an effective force for provoking a crisis of 
political legitimacy and subsequent reflexivity about governance failures and the need for 
reforms. Responding to demands for accountability and learning is important in recovery from 
crisis (Boin et. al, 2017). The investigation commission appointed by the Althing was an 
important step in the learning process. The commission delivered an eight-volume report that 
covered antecedents and causes of the collapse and related events (Investigation Commission 
of Althing, 2010). There were demands for prosecution and punishment of guilty individuals 
as part of the reconciliation process (see also Duffy et al., 2017). Outside the formal systems 
of punishment, individuals were judged by the “street court” and social media, making it 
uncomfortable for former financial tycoons to continue to live in Iceland. Iceland became the 
only country impacted by the 2008 global financial crisis to bring those responsible to criminal 
prosecution and punishment. Post-crisis, there has also been a focus on accountability 
(looking back at politicians’ actions) and learning (looking forward) to evaluate and redesign 
institutions, policies, and practices. Public responses supported stronger leadership and more 
centralised government as a response to the crisis. The experience of the crisis resulted in 
tighter government control over economic and market forces. A constitutional reform process 
was also launched, which used a highly participatory process of deliberation involving the 
public, bypassing political parties. As such, in the Icelandic case, we see how public anger 
and collective action led to the development of new formal arenas for more meaningful citizen 
participation as one outcome of the crisis, although constitutional reform is still ongoing 
(Shiota, 2019). Here, we see how citizen mobilisation helped channel the crisis recovery 
towards “system renewal” (Walby, 2015) in the financial and political spheres. 
 
While public protest was widespread in the Icelandic case, the situation was quite 
different in Newfoundland and Labrador. Much of the concern and protest over the project 
came from Labrador Indigenous community members (Allen, 2017). Protest against the 
project was led by the grassroots Grand Riverkeepers and Labrador Land Protectors (which 
included Indigenous community members and settler supporters). These grassroots groups 
had limited resources and capacity and were often in tension with official Inuit and Innu 
government leadership. Tactics for gaining voice in political and media spheres included 
hunger strikes, demonstrations in Labrador and St. John’s, and occupations of the work site. 
These tactics were met with arrests and legal charges for breaking protest injunctions at the 
work site. This opposition to Muskrat Falls focused on concerns about environmental risks 
and environmental health impacts to downstream (predominantly Indigenous) communities. 
There was a lack of willingness by decision-makers to reopen public participation based on 
new scientific evidence related to potential methyl-mercury contamination. Risk governance 
issues can arise when there is a lack of appropriate and meaningful consultation, failure to 
incorporate checkpoints for ongoing feedback, as well as failing to revisit decisions based on 
new knowledge (Renn, 2008). The Muskrat Falls crisis demonstrates all these risk governance 
failures in relation to downstream communities. As such, it is not surprising that the 
environmental health concerns of downstream communities grew as the project moved 
forward.  
 
In contrast, the public was not significantly engaged in the discussion around Muskrat 
Falls in the lead up to the crisis. Public anger over the economic impacts of the project were 
voiced by a relatively small group of public intellectuals and journalists based in the capital 
city of St. John’s that used blogs, media-work and formal submissions to protest the project. 
Highly visible public critics that focused on the economic unsustainability of the project were 
often publicly vilified by government. Even though their critical perspective on the project was 
vindicated by the Muskrat Falls inquiry, those individuals that spoke out against Muskrat Falls 
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were villainized by the government, Nalcor and other supporters of the project. Their 
involvement was motivated by the public interest but was often seen as an unpatriotic assault 
(House, 2021). The response towards these individuals likely dissuaded others from 
participating, particularly due to the social or economic risk of retribution. The 
interconnectivity of personal politics in small jurisdictions means that these risks may be higher 
than in larger, less connected jurisdictions.   
The lack of widespread protest has been attributed to the “nationalist memory of loss” 
that often characterizes NL political culture and leads to public acceptance or dejection 
(Bannister, 2012). In contrast to the Icelandic case, public anger with decision-makers never 
reached the same scale. In the aftermath of the crisis, a public inquiry on Muskrat Falls was 
established, which invited public input through sessions in Labrador and in St. John’s. 
However, unlike Iceland, we have not yet seen significant reforms to improve citizen 
participation or address the governance failures that led to the crisis. While critics of Muskrat 
Falls often faced challenges for speaking out, especially in the pre-crisis period, Nalcor 
employees and Conservative government decision-makers have faced few social or legal 
repercussions post-crisis. As such, in comparison with Iceland, decision-makers appear to be 
taking a “return to equilibrium” (Walby, 2015) approach to crisis recovery. Among the lessons 
we identify, this represents the clearest point of divergence between the two cases. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
  
 Achieving “full-spectrum sustainability” (Foley et al., 2020) means integrating 
environmental, economic, social, and governance/institutional dimensions of sustainability. 
Island societies are characterised by distinct social identities and political cultures (Vézina, 
2014), which create unique contexts for navigating economic challenges and working towards 
full-spectrum sustainability. We have drawn three lessons from a comparison of the small 
island state of Iceland and the subnational island jurisdiction of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
both of which experienced crises of economic sustainability that were tightly coupled with 
issues of governance/institutional sustainability. As such, both economic crises had the 
potential to “cascade” (Walby, 2015) into crises of political legitimacy, though the actual 
translation of the economic crisis into a political crisis was more apparent in Iceland than in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. On the surface, the Icelandic banking crisis, which was 
embedded in the 2008 global financial crisis, is very different from the ongoing financial crisis 
in Newfoundland and Labrador, which is largely driven by the spiralling costs of the Muskrat 
Falls hydroelectric mega-project. However, a comparison of these disparate economic crises 
illuminates three theoretically generalisable lessons about governance failures and the ways 
in which governance/institutional sustainability can be improved to support economic 
sustainability for small islands and subnational island jurisdictions. 
 
First, while political hubris is not unique to small states and territories, we see that 
similar political cultures of anti-reflexivity led decision-makers to downplay early warning 
signs raised by experts and review processes about the risks of bank deregulation and mega-
project development. Our analysis aligns with earlier findings on how Icelandic crisis 
management reflects egalitarianism (as a dominant cultural value in the country) by displaying 
distrust of experts. There are shared cultural norms that everyone within a group should have 
equal access to risk reduction and hostility is shown to the idea of any one individual or expert 
being dominant in decision-making (Bernhardsdóttir & Svedin, 2004; Coyle & Ellis, 1994). 
In the Newfoundland and Labrador case, a personalistic political culture oriented around 
strong party leaders and informal processes similarly reinforced tendencies towards anti-
reflexivity. As such, the Newfoundland and Labrador case extends Lévêque’s (2020) 
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argument that personalism may be characteristic not just of small states, but of small polities 
more generally.  
 
Second, as both crises became increasingly apparent, there were important 
communication gaps that impeded the flow of vital information. These communication gaps 
were internal to the “back stage” between governmental decision-makers and other key 
agencies, but they also unfolded in the “front stage” between decision-makers and the public 
and media (Wong, 2018). These communication gaps created challenges for the rapid 
mitigation of the economic crisis. On the surface, it seems counter-intuitive or ironic that there 
can be significant communications gaps in such small polities. However, this is consistent 
with the notion that political cultures in small states and territories are characterised by 
informal processes of social interaction and communication (Baldacchino, 2018; Katzenstein, 
1985; Lévêque, 2020). The informality of communication is likely a contributing factor to 
both anti-reflexivity and the communication gaps described here, particularly if it leads 
decision-makers to overstep formal procedures.  
 
Third, political cultures of anti-reflexivity were disrupted by public anger and protest 
after the crises emerged. A key characteristic of small polities is that relationships between 
decision-makers and their constituents are often experienced as more direct and personal 
(Baldacchino, 2018; Lévêque, 2020). Looking to the Icelandic case, one implication of this 
small polity dynamic is that if political leadership is perceived as failing to manage a crisis 
with widespread social impacts, then widespread resentment and volatility are triggered. Part 
of the crisis counter-narrative articulated through public protest was that social values shifted 
away from egalitarianism towards individualism during the pre-crisis period. According to this 
crisis narrative, Icelandic society had become too market-driven at the expense of other values 
of equality and justice (Bernhardsdóttir, 2015). 
While all three processes were present in both case studies, the most notable difference 
was the scope of public anger and mobilisation, which was stronger in Iceland (also see 
Bernburg, 2019; Duffy et al., 2017; Hallgrímsdóttir & Brunet-Jailly, 2015; Jonsson, 2016; 
Loftsdóttir, 2016). This may have been a key factor that tipped Iceland towards a more 
proactive response to the economic crisis and led to containing the crisis more quickly than 
in Newfoundland and Labrador. At the same time, the ability to respond rapidly to economic 
or political threats is seen as a strength of small states when supported by a bedrock of good 
governance (Baldacchino, 2019). Returning to Walby’s (2015) typology of outcomes from 
crisis, the Icelandic case shows more signs of system renewal, where crisis recovery involved 
increasing the oversight and transparency of the financial sector, as well as initiating a process 
of constitutional reform. By contrast, the economic crisis in Newfoundland and Labrador 
continues to unfold. While there was protest against the Muskrat Falls project – led primarily 
by downstream, largely Indigenous communities – public anger never reached the same high 
point and the economic crisis did not cascade into a political crisis in the same way. As such, 
it is unsurprising that we have seen more substantial measures to restore political legitimacy 
and improve governance/institutional sustainability through system renewal in Iceland. By 
contrast, decision-makers in Newfoundland and Labrador seem to be pursuing “a return to 
equilibrium” approach to crisis recovery (Walby, 2015), rather than using the crisis to engage 
in financial or political system renewal. At the same time, this period of crisis is still playing 
out and the possibility remains that public anger will emerge more strongly if the full costs of 
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 The difference in public anger and the political efficacy of protest bears further 
scrutiny as a potential key factor that can instigate the cascading of an economic crisis into a 
political crisis. This begs the question of why public anger was more widespread in the 
Icelandic case, which is difficult to answer based on the secondary data that underlies our case 
studies. For tentative answers, we could look to differences in political culture, where Iceland 
has a more consensus-oriented political system in comparison to Canada’s more federalist-
oriented system (Lijphart, 2012). Relatedly, there appear to be differences in the level of 
citizen engagement and role of civil society in the political culture more broadly, with an 
arguably stronger history of political engagement and civil society participation in Iceland 
than in Newfoundland and Labrador. In his comparison of Iceland and Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Alexander (1980, p. 33) points to the historical persistence of illiteracy and slow 
growth of mass public literacy as social factors that explain the poorer “quality of public life 
and public decision making,” as well as an “unwarranted deference” to political elites in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
 
Another contextual factor that likely helps explain the different crisis responses of the 
two case study regions gets to the core of the island sovereign state versus sub-national island 
jurisdiction comparison. There have long been provincial-national tensions, particularly 
around fisheries and oil development. However, Newfoundland and Labrador can navigate its 
economic crisis with the assumption that the Federal government in Ottawa will ultimately 
intervene if necessary to prevent a provincial bankruptcy (Bedford, 2020). As a sovereign 
state, by contrast, Iceland does not have access to a similar fail-safe. As such, the potential 
consequences of the economic crisis are more severe for Iceland. 
 
Our work follows Randall and Boersma’s (2020) call for more comparative research 
to identify key similarities and differences among small island states and subnational 
jurisdictions, particularly regarding the implementation of sustainable practices. In comparing 
the small island state of Iceland and the subnational island jurisdiction of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, we identify three key factors that contributed to periods of economic crisis and 
highlighted lessons for economic sustainability and governance/institutional sustainability. 
By learning these lessons and addressing issues of political anti-reflexivity and 
communication gaps, we can better mitigate against future crises and contribute to full-
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